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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
this section to include section 8(a) (4) in the list of unfair labor prac-
tices for which injunctive relief is available would be a big step in
providing the employee with more protection against coercion by his
employer. Such a strengthening of the remedy against intimidation
would complement adoption of pre-hearing discovery of employees' state-
ments.
CONCLUSION
It seems anomalous that discovery of employees' statements to the
Board is allowed in original proceedings in federal court but not for
hearings before the Board itself. Since the main argument by the
Board against discovery is fear of employer intimidation, the solution
would appear to be a strengthening of the remedy against such intimida-
tion to complement the adoption of discovery procedures.
On April 13, 1961, the Administrative Conference of the United
States was established by executive order to consider administrative law
problems and make recommendations. The Conference officially endorsed
discovery in Recommendation No. 30 in 1963: "The Conference approves
the principle of discovery in adjudicatory proceedings and recommends
that each agency adopt rules providing for discovery to the extent and
in the manner appropriate to its proceedings.""9 Over five years have
passed and the Board has not yet acted on this recommendation. It is
obvious, therefore, that if a change is to be made, it must come about
through amendment of the National Labor Relations Act by Congress.
Hopefully such action will be forthcoming.
F. FiNc = JARRELL
Military Law-Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial To Try Servicemen for
Civilian Offenses
Since the days of the Continental Army, the question of how much
judicial authority should be vested in the military has been the subject of
continuing debate. The Constitution gave Congress the power "[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other
provision of law.
1 Recommendation No. 30 of the 1963 Administrative Conference of the United
States, quoted in Fuchs, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 15
AD. L. REv. 6, 45 (1963).
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Forces"' but did not further define this power, and Congress has liberally
dispensed judicial power to the military by enacting the codes of military
laws that have governed the armed forces.2
The codification of military law presently in effect is the Uniform
Code of Military Justice3 (UCMJ), which became effective May 31,
1951. When passing the UCMJ, Congress had before it a group of cases
that arose during World War II in which serious offenders escaped trial
because there was no court having jurisdiction by the time their offenses
were discovered.4 Furthermore, Congress was faced for the first time
with large numbers of military dependents accompanying servicemen
abroad.5 To meet these problems, Congress retained from the Articles of
War court-martial jurisdiction for the military over certain civilians0 and
enlarged military jurisdiction over discharged servicemen7 and active-
duty personnel.
Expanded court-martial jurisdiction under the UCMJ was rapidly
attacked by both ex-servicemen9 and civilians, 10 and their attacks were
mostly successful." The Supreme Court in these cases based its diminution
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2W. AYcocK & S. WuaREL, MLITARY LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUsTIcE 11-15 (1955) [hereinafter cited as AYcOcK & WURFEL]; Bishop,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regudars, Re-
servists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 319-27 (1964).
"10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
'United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955). See AYcocK
& WURFEL 43-44.
'Aycocy, & WuRFEL 59-63.
' Compare Article of War 2, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. II, § 1, 41 Stat.
787 with UCMJ art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1964).
7 UCMJ art. 3(a), 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964) provides:
Subject to section 843 of this title (article 43) no person charged with
having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this chap-
ter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years
or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United
States or of a state, a Territory, or the District of Columbia, may be relieved
from amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the termination of
that status.
Article of War 94, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. II, § 1, 41 Stat. 805-06, pro-
vided for court-martial jurisdiction after discharge only for fraud, larceny, or
embezzlement committed against the government while on active duty.
' Compare the proviso to Article of War 92, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch.
II, § 1, 41 Stat. 805 with UCMJ art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1964).
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
"
0McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) ; Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1-957).
" Only Mrs. Covert was unsuccessful on her first attempt. Reid v. Covert, 351
U.S. 487 (1956).
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of military jurisdiction on the fact that the defendants were not military
personnel and therefore were not properly "in the land or naval forces"
so as to be excluded from the fifth and sixth amendment rights to indict-
ment and trial by jury. 2 But the Court's language seemed to preclude
its ever withholding military jurisdiction over active-duty servicemen.1"
The lower courts in both the federal and military appeals systems con-
sidered the question closed after the statement in Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton that "[t] he test for jurisdiction . .. is one of statts,
namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person
who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval Forces.' "14
In subsequent cases the question of military jurisdiction over active-duty
personnel, when raised, was summarily dismissed.'"
The Supreme Court, without overruling the previous cases, decided
in O'Callahan v. Parker"0 that an active-duty serviceman was not auto-
matically subject to court-martial jurisdiction. The Court rejected so
much of the Singleton "status" test as would give automatic jurisdiction
and stated that active-duty status is necessary, but not alone sufficient, to
vest military jurisdiction.' 7 The Court furnished a list of seven, or
possibly eight, factors indicating that the defendant O'Callahan was so
severed from the military at the time and under the circumstances of his
alleged offenses that he must be considered a civilian for jurisdictional
12 U.S. CoNST. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces .... ." The exception
has been extended by implication to the right to trial by jury contained in the
sixth amendment. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
" When the offense was cognizable in a civil court, the military's jurisdiction
was concurrent. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23, 30 (1957). See also Peek
v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964),
in which an active-duty soldier committed an armed robbery of a military courier on
a military post with a weapon issued him by the Army. The soldier objected to
trial in the federal district court on the grounds that the military had preferential
jurisdiction. His contention was held to be without merit.
"'Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960).
"Branford v. United States, 356 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1966) ; Owens v. Markley,
289 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1961); Pickens v. Cox, 282 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1960);
Thompson v. Willingham, 217 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Pa. 1962); United States v.
Schafer, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 83, 32 C.M.R. 83 (1962); Herrington, A.C.M. 18339, 33
C.M.R. 814 (1963); Panchisin, A.C.M. 17156, 30 C.M.R. 921 (1961).
16395 U.S. 258 (1969). For the procedural history see O'Callahan v. Parker,
256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966), appeal dismissed, 372 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1967),
aff'd on rehearing, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 822 (1968);
military appeal reported, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967).
17 395 U.S. at 266-67.
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purposes. The charges against O'Callahan grew out of an attempted rape
perpetrated in the city of Honolulu, Hawaii-not "on a military post or
enclave .... -18 At the time the crime was committed, O'Callahan was
on leave in the city. 9 The victim was a fourteen-year-old girl vacationing
in Hawaii who had no military connection whatsoever ;20 she was not a
person "performing any duties relating to the military."'" The offense
was committed in peacetime; the civil courts were open and available;
and the offense was committed within the territorial limits of the United
States.22 No question of military authority, security, or property was
involved in the case.3 Finally, although the fact was not mentioned in
the holding, O'Callahan was in civilian clothes when he allegedly at-
tempted to rape the girl.24 This combination of factors was persuasive
to the Court in its finding that the case did not arise "in the land or
naval forces" and that O'Callahan was entitled to a grand jury indict-
ment under the fifth amendment and a jury trial under the sixth amend-
ment.
25
If the Court's statement that these offenses were not "committed on
a military post or enclave" 20 is strictly construed, it will mean that the
military can exercise jurisdiction over any offense committed by an active-
duty serviceman on post without considering the other factors, but that
civil courts have jurisdiction over all off-post offenses. The Court of
Military Appeals27 now will apparently sustain military jurisdiction over
all on-post offenses committed by servicemen,2 s and also will uphold mili-
"1 Id. at 273.
1d. at 259-61, 273.
0 O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360, 361 (3d Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court
did not mention this total lack of military connection in the statement of facts.21395 U.S. at 273.
2 d.
" Id. at 274.
"'Id. at 259.
20 Certiorari was granted to consider the limited question of whether court-
martial jurisdiction over essentially civilian crimes is a denial of the fifth and
sixth amendment jury rights. 395 U.S. at 261. The Court mentioned other pro-
cedural deficiencies of courts-martial-possible command influence, ad hoc judicial
bodies, vague statutes, a preference for discipline rather than justice-that may
have influenced the decision. Id. at 262-66.
2
0 Id. at 273.
" The Court of Military Appeals is the highest appellate court in the military
justice hierarchy; it consists of three civilian judges who hear appeals from all
services. 10 U.S.C.A. § 867 (Supp. 1969).
" United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 561, 40 C.M.R. 272, - (1969);
United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). See HEAD-
QUARTERs, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-69-24, Oct. 2, 1969, 1-6
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tary jurisdiction over off-post offenses in limited circumstances. 2  The
Court of Military Appeals seems to be correct in its interpretation of
jurisdiction over on-post offenses inasmuch as the military commander
is totally responsible for discipline and morale on his installation and
thus has a significant interest in exercising jurisdiction. Military in-
terests may extend to off-post offenses as well, and the territorial boundary
of the post should not become an automatic jurisdictional barrier. Spe-
cific examples of the correct exercise of military jurisdiction over off-post
offenses are more easily considered in connection with the other factors
in O'Callahan since in such cases at least some of these other factors
must be present to justify military jurisdiction.
The Court in deciding O'Callahan did not clearly define what relation-
ship must exist between the accused's service duties and his offense for
the military to exercise jurisdiction. If all other factors are the same, the
absence status of the accused should make little difference in determining
whether the offense is "service connected"; however, the duty status of the
accused at the time of the offense bears directly on connection with the
service. The Court did not confine itself strictly to on-duty offenses, but
spoke of a "connection"8 0 between the accused's duties and the crime.
Presumably, then, when the off-post offense is inseparable from the
accused's duties, military jurisdiction is appropriate. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has not yet directly addressed itself to the situation in which
an on-duty serviceman commits an off-post offense,8 ' but it should permit
the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case.
If the victim must actually be performing military duties at the time
[hereinafter cited as DA PAm 27-69-24], digesting the following cases from the
Court of Military Appeals: United States v. Henderson, No. 22,128, Sept. 26,
1969 (carnal knowledge committed off post not subject to court-martial jurisdic-
tion); United States v. Smith, No. 22,180, Sept. 26, 1969 (contra, when carnal
knowledge committed on post); United States v. Riehle, No. 22,040, Sept. 26, 1969
(no court-martial jurisdiction over off-post auto theft) ; United States v. Paxiao,
No. 22,230, Sept. 26, 1969 (contra, when auto theft committed on post); United
States v. Shockley, No. 21,667, Sept. 26, 1969 (court-martial jurisdiction over sod-
omy committed on post; contra, off post); United States v. Williams, No. 22,176,
Sept. 26, 1969 (court-martial jurisdiction over bad checks cashed on post; contra,
off post) ; United States v. Crapo, No. 21,866, Sept. 26, 1969 (court-martial juris-
diction over robbery where force and violence occurred on post; contra, off post).
SE.g., off-post narcotics offenses. See p. 388 & note 47 infra.0 395 U.S. at 273.
81 In the only reported case in which this factor was specifically discussed, the
offender was either off duty or on leave when he committed each of his offenses.
United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). The court
did not give the date of Borys' offenses, but the case apparently applies O'Callahan
retroactively. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
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of the offense, few off-post cases will come before courts-martial: The
only military persons regularly performing duties off post are military
policemen, investigators, vehicle drivers, recruiters, and the like. On the
other hand, if the victim need only be connected with the military in some
fashion, many more off-post crimes committed by servicemen will be
tried in military courts.
Thus far, the Court of Military Appeals has followed the language
of the Supreme Court to the letter, even to the extent of finding that
carnal knowledge of a military dependent off post does not invoke military
jurisdiction. The court stated in United States v. Henderson" that the
victim's "service connection was natal and not legal and, as such, [was]
insufficient to bring her personally within the ambit of the Uniform
Code." If by this language the Court of Military Appeals meant that
off-post offenses committed against other servicemen who are off duty,
but still within the ambit of the UCMJ, are subject to court-martial
jurisdiction, its interpretation should be sustained. However, by ex-
cluding dependents from the category of victims whose status allows court-
martial jurisdiction, the Court of Military Appeals did not give sufficient
attention to the impact on the military community of crimes perpetrated
against dependents. That husbands and fathers are often absent for ex-
tended periods places on the military system an additional burden of pro-
tecting dependents; offenses by servicemen against dependents should be
considered to have the same military significance as offenses against other
servicemen.
Three factors in the Court's resolution of O'Callahan-that he offense
occur in peacetime, that the civil courts be open, and that the offense be
committed within the territorial limits of the United States 4-- are ob-
viously concomitants of one another. If civil jurisdiction is to vest only
over those cases that occur within the territorial limits 5 of the United
States, then "civil courts" must mean the state and federal courts.86 Since
" No. 22,128, Sept. 26, 1969, digested in DA PAm 27-69-24 at 1.
" Id. (the quotation is extracted from the court's opinion).
395 U.S. at 273.
= The Court of Military Appeals has indicated that this interpretation will be
followed. United States v. Goldman, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 517, 40 C.M.R. 228,
- (1969). Chief Judge Quinn so stated in his dissent in United States v. Borys,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 551, 40 C.M.R. 257, - (1969) (dissenting opinion).
"But see the dissenting opinion in United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
547, 551-53, 40 C.M.R. 257, - (1969), the key rationale of which is that the
Hawaiian courts at the time of O'Callahan's alleged offenses were federal courts,
and that therefore the words "civil courts" in O'Callahan mean only federal
courts.
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these courts will always be available, except in times of imposition of
martial law or of actual invasion, the only question remaining is the
meaning of the term "peacetime." One judge on the Army Court of
Military Review37 has stated in several cases that the Vietnam conflict-
a time of war for purposes of removing the statute of limitations on
offenses of unauthorized absence 3 -- is a sufficient time of war for court-
martial jurisdiction under O'Callahan.39 Although the Court of Military
Appeals has not explicitly decided the question, apparently the court has
assumed that the Vietnam conflict is not a time of war. It has dismissed
several cases arising after O'Callahan on the grounds of lack of court-
martial jurisdiction.40 Had the Court of Military Appeals found the
present conflict to be a time of war, presumably it would have sustained
jurisdiction. The court is probably correct in its assumption: The
existence of a distant war, declared or undeclared, has little relevance to
a crime committed within the territorial United States by an active-duty
serviceman." Absent declared war, and probably not even then so long
as the actual fighting remains distant, offenses committed within the
United States should be deemed "peacetime" offenses.
The final factor that the Court outlined in O'Callahan was that the
offense charged did not concern military authority, security, or prop-
erty.42 If "security" means the physical integrity of the installation and
the documents and equipment thereon,43 few problems of interpretation
UThe Courts of Military Review are the intermediate appellate courts in the
military. These courts review only the cases arising in the branch of the service
that they serve. 10 U.S.C. §866 (1964) established these courts, which were
formerly called Boards of Review.
"Anderson, C.M. 416112, 38 C.M.R. 582 (1967).
"
9 White, C.M. 420140, Aug. 12, 1969; Vipond, C.M. 420264, July 23, 1969, both
digested in HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-69-23;
Sept. 25, 1969, at 4, 5 [hereinafter cited as DA PAM 27-69-23]; Konieczko, C.M.
419706, June 19, 1969 digested in HEAD)QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
PAMPHLET 27-69-20, Aug. 14, 1969, at 10.
"
0 See those cases cited note 28 supra, that were dismissed for lack of court-
martial jurisdiction.
"' The only authoritative case in point appears to be Caldwell v. Parker, 252
U.S. 376 (1920), holding that the civilian courts had concurrent jurisdiction over
a murder committed by an active-duty serviceman in the state of Alabama during
World War I. This case arose under the Articles of War, which forbade military
trials of defendants charged with capital crimes committed within the United States.
The Court indicated that there was a sufficient time of war for the exercise of
military jurisdiction, but that such jurisdiction was not exclusive. But see Ex parte
King, 246 F. 868 (E.D. Ky. 1917).
12 395 U.S. at 274.
" The Court of Military Appeals has not gone beyond this definition. See DA
PAM 27-69-24, at 2-4, 6-7, digesting United States v. Smith, No. 22,180, Sept. 26,
[Vol. 48
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should arise. "Property" is self-explanatory. "Military authority," how-
ever, is a rather complex concept. If by the phrase "flouting of military
authority" 44 the Court means purely military offenses such as dis-
obedience of a lawful order or assaulting a superior in the performance of
his duties, then the same objections arise as when "military victim" is
construed too literally. Situations immediately come to mind in which
an off-duty individual could commit an offense against his direct superior,
also off-duty, and be subject only to civil law under a restrictive in-
terpretation of "military authority." Yet civilian courts cannot consider
the implications of the offense on military effectiveness, and the services
must prevent off-duty activities from interfering with command struc-
tures. The danger exists, of course, that the phrase "flouting of military
authority" could be used to justify prosecuting off-base political activism
or other disapproved, but not illegal, conduct.4 5 This phrase should be
broadly construed when an offense is committed against another service-
man, but not when the crime is essentially victimless, as in narcotics
cases or when non-illegal conduct, such as political activity, is involved.
Whether the accused was in civilian clothes at the time of the offense
is also a pertinent consideration. The Court of Military Appeals has
1969; United States v. Shockley, No. 21,667, Sept. 26, 1969; United States v.
Paxiao, No. 22,230, Sept. 26, 1969; United States v. Harris, No. 22,028, Sept. 26,
1969.
"395 U.S. at 274.
' Since there is no specific provision in the UCMJ under which enlisted per-
sonnel could be prosecuted for such activities, the charge would have to be brought
under art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964), which provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of the good order and discipline in the armed forces, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and
offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty,
shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special or summary court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at
the discretion of the court.
The "crimes and offenses not capital" clause refers only to those crimes denounced
by Congress in the United States Code and thus would not apply in the situation
under consideration. AYcocK & WuRFEL 311-12. Prosecution could be brought
under either the "to the prejudice of the good order and discipline" clause or the
"discredit to the armed forces" clause. However, there could be no prosecution
under art. 134 for an offense separately denounced in the UCMJ. United States v.
Norris, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 239-40, 8 C.M.R. 36, 39-40 (1953); United States v.
Haywood, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 377, 9 C.M.R. 6, 7 (1953); AYcocx & WtrFEL
313. Depending upon the particular activity involved, an officer can be prosecuted
under art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1964), for contempt toward officials, and under
art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964), for conduct unbecoming an officer. United States
v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
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found the lack of uniform to be significant.4" Where other considera-
tions are inconclusive, that the offender was uniformed could tip the
balance in favor of military jurisdiction; but the presence of the uniform,
without more, should not be enough to sustain court-martial jurisdiction.
Narcotics present a special problem since Congress has not in the
UCMJ specifically prohibited their use or possession. Traditionally, nar-
cotics offenses have been punished as violations of the general article
prohibiting conduct to the "prejudice of the good order and discipline in
the armed forces."47 An alternative method has been the issuance of an
order forbidding use and possession and prosecution for disobedience of
the order.48 Because an off-post narcotics violation has no classical
"victim" and will* most likely occur while the offender is off duty and
in civilian clothes, a strict reading of O'Callahan often will not allow
the military to exercise jurisdiction. The Court of Military Appeals has
decided, however, to sustain court-martial jurisdiction over all off-post
narcotics offenses.49 In reaching this result, the court in narcotics cases
apparently has considered the factors of whether there is "no military
significance" and the offense is "not service connected" separately from
the others set forth in O'Callahan. It seems obvious that these phrases
have no meaning except that which is given them by the facts of the case.
O'Callahan should be as binding on military jurisdiction over narcotics
offenses as it is in all other cases.
Under O'Callahan, civilian courts are assured exclusive jurisdiction
over a serviceman only when he is accused of an offense committed off
post within the United States in peacetime while he was not on duty,
and if it involves no question of military authority, property, or security.
In civilian courts a serviceman charged with a felony is guaranteed a
grand jury indictment and trial by his peers, a court and counsel owing
allegiance only to their own consciences, the remedy of a declaratory
judgment if he is prosecuted under an invalid statute, and "an atmosphere
conducive to the protection of individual rights ... ."0 Another sig-
"'United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969).
" United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, 24 C.M.R. 135 (1957) ; United
States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954).
" See, e.g., United States v. Castro, No. 22,046, Sept. 26, 1969, digested in DA
PAm 27-69-24, at 4; United States v. Koepke, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 39 C.M.R.
100 (1969).
"'See United States v. Castro, No. 22,046, Sept. 26, 1969, digested it DA PAM
27-69-24, at 4. See also United States v. Boyd, No. 22,120, Sept. 19, 1969; United
States v. Beeker, No. 21,787, Sept. 12, 1969, both digested in DA PAM 27-69-23,
at 1, 3.10 395 U.S. at 266.
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nificant advantage to the serviceman defendant, not mentioned by the
Supreme Court in O'Callahan, is that vesting exclusive jurisdiction in
the civil courts over certain offenses removes the double jeopardy to which
he was subject when the civil and military courts had concurrent juris-
diction. 1 With exclusive civil jurisdiction, the only legal action that
can be taken by the military is a prosecution for any period of un-
authorized absence generated by civilian confinement.52
The holding of O'Callahan, however, is not limited to serious offenses,
which entitle the offender to a jury trial. The Court simply stated that
the defendant "could not be tried by court-martial but rather was entitled
to trial by the civilian courts."53 By this statement it presumably meant
to require exclusive civil jurisdiction over all offenses that satisfy the
elements of O'Callahan. Since there is as yet no right to a jury in trials
of "petty" offenses,54 the military offender tried in a civilian court for a
petty offense is faced with severe military consequences without having
gained the advantage of a jury trial. Because civil authorities with
exclusive jurisdiction over a petty offender can no longer turn him over
to the military for trial, he will either make bond or be jailed. If he is
able to make bond and return to his unit before being declared absent
without leave, his subsequent return to civil authorities for trial, and any
sentence served, will not be considered a punishable unauthorized ab-
sence,5 but he will have to make up the lost time at the end of his enlist-
ment.5"
The military petty offender who is unable to make bond before his
authorized absence expires is in more serious trouble. If he is held in jail
beyond his authorized absence period and is later convicted, even if he
meanwhile returned to duty, the initial absence becomes unauthorized,
although the period of confinement is not ;57 both periods, however, must
be made up by an equal amount of additional active duty.58 As for the
"'E.g., United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 548, 40 C.M.R. 257, -
(1969) (civilian acquittal followed by military conviction); Herrington, A.C.M.
18339, 33' C.M.R. 814 (1963) (simultaneous murder trials by civil and military
courts, both resulting in convictions).
'" MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 165 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as MCM (1969)].
Is 395 U.S. at 274.
" Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
61 MCM 165 (1969).
5G10 U.S.C. § 972 (1964).
7MCM 165 (1969).
810 U.S.C. § 972 (1964).
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petty offender who is unable to make bail at any time before trial, upon
conviction his absence becomes unauthorized from the time that his pass
or leave expired ;59 as of that time his pay and any family allotment stop ;60
the period of confinement is "bad time" that must be made up ;"1 and upon
returning to duty he will be subject to military prosecution as an un-
authorized absentee for the period of confinement by the civil authorities.
2
Conversely, if the serviceman were initially returned to the military
for disciplinary action, he would not have to answer for unauthorized
absence (unless he were held by civilian authorities past his authorized
absence period) ; he could not lose more than two-thirds of his pay for
whatever the period of punishment adjudged ;63 his family allotment could
not be added onto his pay before computing the forfeiture and would
continue unabated ;" and he would incur no "bad time" to make up unless
confined by the military as punishment."
The ragged division of jurisdiction resulting from O'Callahal will
cause the military and civilian bench and bar considerable difficulty until
firmer jurisdictional lines are hammered out in new cases, and the de-
cision may result in injustice to individual defendants in test cases.
Nevertheless, two valuable safeguards are afforded the serious offender
by the holding in O'Callahan. First, the decision provides for the appli-
cation of the procedural safeguard of the jury system to those cases in-
volving servicemen that the military should have little interest in prose-
cuting; second, by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the civil courts,
O'Callahan reduces the possibility of double jeopardy for service per-
sonnel that was always present under concurrent jurisdiction. But until
the Court extends the right to a jury trial to all civilian criminal de-
fendants, 66 or until the UCMJ and the military's financial regulations
are altered to mitigate the military consequences of a civilian conviction,
- MCM 165 (1969).
60 MS ComP. GEN. (1959), digested in 9 DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES Pay and Allowances § 21.3 (1959-60) ;
36 COMP. GEN. 173 (1956), digested in 6 DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES Pay and Allowances § 18.1 (1956-57).
01 10 U.S.C. § 972 (1964).
"MCM 165 (1969).
08Id. 15(b), 16(b). This statement assumes that any petty offense will not
be tried by a general court-martial.
"Id. 126(h) (2).
"10 U.S.C. § 972 (1964). Restriction to certain limits, a common punishment
for minor offenses, is not "bad time" under this statute.
" Some states do provide for a jury trial for all defendants charged with crimes.
See, e.g., N.C. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 12, 13.
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those offenders whose crimes are classified as petty offenses under pre-
vailing constitutional standards should not be deprived of the potential
collateral advantages of a military trial and should be excluded from the
O'Callahan rule.
RoGER GROOT
Patents-The Overruling of the Licensee Estoppel Doctrine
The favored status once enjoyed by patentees before the United States
Supreme Court has undergone considerable change in this century. Many
of the older concepts have been re-examined in light of the current state
of the patent system and the competing demands of other areas of the
law. For example, the exclusiveness of the patent grant is repugnant to
the free-competition teachings of antitrust policy. These factors have
prompted searching reappraisals of the privileges historically inherent
in the grant; in some cases, privilege-bestowing decisions of the past
have fallen.
More than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court held that one
who had derived benefits from the use of another's patent was estopped to
deny its validity when sued by the owner for a share of the profits.' The
effect of the estoppel doctrine was to shield many questionable patents
from attack. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins the Supreme Court recently dis-
approved this venerable doctrine. The Court stressed the strong public
interest in general circulation and use of ideas not entitled to patent
protection3 and reasoned that the estoppel doctrine was often a bar to
the most logical contestant of patentability.4
Adkins, while employed by Lear, had designed an apparatus increasing
the accuracy of gyroscopes. While his patent application was pending, he
licensed Lear to use his invention in return for royalties. After paying
royalties for approximately two years, Lear decided that the discovery by
Adkins had been fully anticipated by a prior patent and announced that
it would no longer pay royalties on production at one of its locations. Lear
later discontinued payments altogether. Shortly thereafter, Adkins finally
"Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).289 S. Ct. 1902 (1969).
2Id. at 1910-11.
'Id. at 1911. The high costs of patent litigation and the specter of possible
treble damages for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964) can effectively deter
a third party from attacking a patent that he desires to use. Although the same
hardships may confront the licensee, he has more to gain since he is already util-
izing the patent and is saddled with royalty payments.
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